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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE B. CATMULL and FLOR-
ENCE M. CATMULL, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
GEORGE T. JOHNSON, SNOWBIRD, 
LTD., and RICHARD D. BASS, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
13927 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this action the plamtiffs-respondente recovered 
a judgment against defendants-appellants on a contract 
for payment of royalties in connection with use of certain 
real propeorty located in Little Cottonwood Canyon, Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted a judgment for the plaintiffs-
respondents as against defendants-appellants George T. 
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Johnson and Snowbird, Ltd. in the total amount of 
$9,698.60, and dismissed the plaintiffs-respondents' cause 
of action as against defendant Richard D. Bass. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-appellants seek a reversal of the judg-
ment entered against them below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 28, 1966, plaintiffs-respondents (here^ 
after referred to as "Cattmulls," George B. Catmull here-
after referred to individually as "Gatmull") deeded to 
defendant George T. Johnson (hereafter referred to as 
"Johnson") all of their right, title and interest in certain 
mining claims patented in the name of Gatmull, located 
in litt le Cottonwood Canyon, Salt Lake County, Utah 
(hereafter referred to as the "Free Coinage Claims") (Ex. 
8-P). This deed was subject to an agreement also dated 
February 28,1966, between Johnson and Catmull, where-
by Johnson agreed,, in relevant part, to pay to Catmull 
a percentage of the gross receipts received by 
[Johnson] from any ski lift erected upon the 
above described lands, according to the follow-
ing terms: 
(a) Five percent (5%) of gross receipts 
if such lift is erected wholly upon the subject 
lands; 
(b) If such lift is erected only partially 
upon the subject lands, said five percent (5%) 
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of gross receipts shall be prorated in ratio of 
the length of such lift on the subject lands as 
against 'the total length of such lift; but in no 
event shall grantor receive less than two percent 
(2%) of said gross receipts. Ex. 5-P. 
This agreement shall hereafter be referred to as "the 
1966 Agreement." 
Subsequent to the 1966 Agreement, Johnson deeded 
the Free Coinage Claims to one Alta Snowbird Ltd., a 
Utah limited partnership. Shortly thereafter Alta Snow-
bird Ltd. conveyed it to defendant-appellant Snowbird 
Ltd. (hereafter referred to as "Snowbird") a Utah limited 
partnership. When Snowbird encoimtered difficulties in 
obtaining financing in order to realize its plans for the 
construction of a ski resort in the environs of the Free 
Coinage Claims, Johnson initiated negotiations with Cat-
mull (R. 32, 42-44, 76, 87). These negotiations culminated 
in a document entitled Amendment to Agreement, dated 
December 18, 1969, which provided in relevant part as 
follows: 
For valuable consideration, I [Catmull] here-
by amend our Agreement of February 28, 1966 
to provide that you or any successor in interest 
may purchase and acquire all of my rights and 
interests under said Agreement upon payment to 
me in cash as follows: 
If paid on or before July 1, 1970 the total 
price shall be $17,000.00. 
If paid after July 1, 1970 the total price 
shall be $21,000.00. Ex. 1-D. 
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This Amendment to Agreement is hereafter referred to as 
"the 1969 Amendment." 
Johnson paid Catmull the sum of $10 as consideration 
for the 1969 Amendment, by a check dated December 18, 
1969, on which it was noted "For Amendment to Agree-
ment of February 28, 1966" (R. 35, Ex. 3-D). 
In January, 1970 Snowbird obtained major financing 
and commenced to a>nstruct its ski facilities in Little 
Cottonwood Canyon, Major construction was concen-
trated in the summer of 1970 on the main lodge and tram 
facilities (R. 36). In the summer of 1971, construction 
was commenced on the Gad II chairlift which lift crossed 
the Free Coinage Claims for a linear distance of approxi-
mately 922 feet (R. 36, Ex. 13-P). By February, 1972, the 
Gad II lift was in operation and generating revenues (R. 
36-37). The total cable length of Gad II is 4,059 feet 
(R. 186); the vertical rise from the bottom of the lift 
to the top of the lift is 1249 feet (R. 151, Ex. 22-P); 
Gad II's maximum capacity to carry passengers to the 
top is 1200 passengers per hour (R. 137, Ex. 11-P). 
In the fall of 1972 Johnson attempted to initiate dis-
cusions with Oatmull in connection with exercising his 
rights under the 1969 Amendment (R. 38). In April, 
1973, Johnson offered Catmull the sum of $17,000 for 
purchase of Oatmuirs rights under the 1966 Agreement, 
which offer was refused by Catmull (R. 39). By a letter 
dated May 16, 1973, Catmull informed Johnson that he 
did not want to sell his royalty rights on the Free Coin-
age Claims (Ex. 6-P). On May 24, 1969, Johnson ten-
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denied a draft in the amount of $21y000 to Catmuli, fbo* 
purchase of CaitmuU's rights under the 1966 Agreement, 
as per the terms of the 1969 Amendment, and Caitmull 
refused the tender (R. 40, Ex. 4-D). Prior to May, 1973, 
Cajtmull at no time made a specific demand on Johnson 
or on Snowbird for payment of royalties or for payment 
of the $21,000 according to the terms of the 1969 Amend-
ment (R. 201). 
Thereafter this litigation was commenced, Catmulls 
seeking a judgment for the royalties claimed as due pur-
suant to the 1966 Agreement. Johnson and Snowbird re-
fused payment of the claimed royalties on the grounds 
that Oa/tmuU's refusal of the May, 1973 tender was 
wrongful, and that they had a right, pursuant to the 1969 
Amendment, to purchase CaitmuU's royalty rights for the 
sum of $21,000. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUD-
ING THAT THE AMENDMENT TO AGREE-
MENT WAS VOID FOR FAILURE OF CON-
SIDERATION AND LACK OF MUTUALITY. 
The trial court concluded that the 1969 Amendment 
was void and unenforceable by Johnson because of lack 
of consideration and lack of mutuality. Conclusions of 
Law, paragraph 3; Memorandum Decision, paragraph 2. 
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court was clearly in 
error. 
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By the 1969 Amendment, Catmull gave Johnson an 
option to purchase his rights in the Free Coinage Claims 
for the sum of $17,000' if exercised within six months, or 
for the sum of $21,000 if exercised thereafter. The Amend-
ment itself does not contain the word "option," but the 
rights and liabilities created by the 1969 Amendment are 
clearly within the scope of what is commonly referred 
to as an option. Professor Williston defines an option as: 
a unilateral contract whereby the optionor for a 
valuable consideration grants the optionee a right 
to make a contract of purchase but does not 
bind the optionee to do so; the optionor is bound 
during the life of the option, but the optionee 
is not. 1 Williston on Contracts, (3rd ed. 1957) 
§ 61 A. (Footnotes and citations omitted.) 
Professor Williston further notes: 
The fact that the optionee is free while the 
optionor is bound raises the question whether 
mutuality plays a part in the option transaction. 
Written agreements known as options are not 
necessarily void for lack of mutuality, and, where 
accepted within the time specified, may become 
valid and enforceable contracts. Mutuality of 
obligation can be supplied by adding the con-
tractual ingredient known as consideration. 
* * * 
Consideration sufficient to support the usual 
contract will support an option. 1 Williston on 
Contracts, (3rd ed. 1957) § 61B. (Footnotes and 
citations omitted.) 
See also Steel v. Eagle, (1971) 207 Kan. 146, 483 P. 2d 
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1063; Mack v. Coker, (1974) 22 Ariz. App. 105, 523 P. 
2d 1342. 
In the instant matter, it is uncootroverted that John-
son paid the sum of $10 to Catmull as consideration for 
the 1969 Amendment. Johnson's check in that amount, 
dated December 18, 1969 and marked with specific ref-
erence to the 1969 Amendment, was introduced into evi-
dence (Ex. 3-D). This is clearly sufficient consMeration 
to support the option as a unilateral contract binding 
upon Catmull and enforceable according to its terms by 
Johnson. In Baker v. Mulrooney, (8th Cir. 1920) 265 
F. 529, the court enforced an option which was supported 
by the sum of $10, holding that such a sum was sufficient 
consdideration to make the offer of sale a grant of an irre-
vocable and exclusive option. 
The trial court may have confused the necessity of 
contractual consideration with the concept of mutuality 
of obligation. It is certainly true that Johnson, by the 
terms of the 1969 Amendment, bad no obligation to pur-
chase Catmull's rights in the Free Coinage Claims. How-
ever mutuality of obligation is not always necessary for 
a contract to be binding and enforceable. The Supreme 
Court of Utah has distinguished the two concepts of 
mutuality of obligation and contractual consideration as 
follows: 
The doctrine of mutuality of obligation appears 
to be merely one aspect of the rule that mutual 
promises constitute considerations for each other. 
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Where there is no other consideration for a con-
tract, mutual promises must be binding on both 
parities. But where there is any other consider-
ation for the contract, mutuality of obligation 
is not essential. Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 
(1951) 120 Utah 608, 612, 237 P. 2d 823, 825. 
The $10 consideration given by Johnson to Caitmull 
for the 1969 Amendment is not disputed herein. Clearly 
the trial court's conclusion that the Amendment was un-
enforceable for lack of consideration and mutuality of 
obligation was erroneous, and should foe reversed by this 
court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUD-
ING THAT THE 1969 AMENDMENT WAS 
UNENFORCEABLE IN MAY, 1973 DUE TO 
THE LAPSE OF TIME. 
The trial court concluded that the 1969 Amendment, 
Which had no specific expiration date with respect to the 
option to purchase for $21,000, gave Johnson the right 
to purchase the Free Coinage Claims for a reasonable 
period of time. Memorandum Decision, paragraph 2; Con-
clusions of Law, paragraph 3. Such a construction of the 
open-ended offer is in accordance with decisions in this 
jurisdiction and generally. See Commercial Security Bank 
of Ogden v. Johnson, (1946) 110 Utah 342,173 P. 2d 277; 
Colorado Woman's College v. Bradford-Robinson Printing 
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Co., (1945) 114 Colo. 237,157 P. 2d 612; Boswell v. United 
States, (5th Cir. 1941) 123 F. 2d 213. However, the *rial 
court erroneously concluded that more than a reasonable 
time period had passed following the execution of the 
1969 Amendment and before Johnson's tender of the 
$21,000, and that therefore the option had expired prior 
to Johnson's tender. This conclusion is not supported by 
the evidence. 
In Utah, the test for determining what is a reason-
able period of time for performance of a contractual obli-
gation is as follows: 
So much time as is necessary, under the cir-
cumstances, to do conveniently what the contract 
or duty require should be done in a particular 
case. 
So much time as is necessary, for a reason-
ably prudent and diligent man to do, conveni-
ently, what the contract or duty requires should 
be done, having a regard for the rights and pos-
sibility of loss, if any, to the other part to be 
affected. Commercial Security Bank of Ogden 
v. Johnson, (1946) 110 Utah 342, 349, 173 P. 2d 
277,281. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 
When the facts are not disputed, as in the instant 
matter, the deteaiiimation of what is a reasonable period 
of time is a conclusion of law, and is therefore subject 
to the full review of this Court. Alpern v. May fair Mar-
kets, (1953) 118 Gal. App. 2d 541, 258 P. 2d 7; Colorado 
Woman's College v. Bradford-Robinson Printing Co., 
(1945) 114 Colo. 237, 157 P. 2d 612. 
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The leading case in Utah to deal with the facts and 
circumstances relevant to the question of what is a "rea-
sonable time" is Commercial Security Bank of Ogden v. 
Johnson, supra. That case involved the sale of certain 
real property by the defendants-sellers to the plaintiffs-
purchasers. The contract of sale provided that, as part 
of the consideration for the sale, the purchasers would 
construct and put into operation an industrial alcohol 
distilling plant on the subject premises. Following de-
livery of the deed to the buyers, the buyers made prepa-
rations for the conisttiiudionL of the pliant. However, they 
were unable to obtain adequate financing for the planned 
cx>nstruction, and the plant was never built. After a 
period of nearly four years, the sellers rented the prem-
ises to a third party and demanded rescission of the 
contract. Since the parties had not specified a date for 
completion of the plant's construction, the issue as to 
whether or not the sellers could rightfully rescind de-
pended upon whether the four year period of time was 
more than a "reasonable time" for the buyers to have 
performed their contractual obligation. 
The court focused upon the factors considered by 
the parties themselves, at the time they contracted, in 
order to determine! the issue of reasonable time. The 
buyers contended that their difficulties in obtaining fi-
nancing were to be considered as one of the relevant 
circumstances in evaluating the reasonableness of the 
delay. However,,, the court concluded that the parties 
had not contracted with reference to the buyer's finan-
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cial abilities. Rather, the sellers (church affiliated cor-
porations and individuals) were interested in achieving 
the construction and actual operation of the plant, in 
order that employment opportunities would be created for 
the local populace. The buyers were well aware of this. 
The court noted: 
The Seller and Buyer did not contract in 
reference to the financing of the venture. I t is 
apparent that the Seller assumed the Buyers 
were able financially to start and complete the 
plant and to put it into operation. . . . As re-
vealed by the record the reason the Seller was 
interested in the consitruction and operation of 
the plant was to provide employment for the peo-
ple living in that vicinity. That purpose was 
well known to the Buyers. That purpose could 
be fulfilled only by the construction of the plant 
and putting it into operation in a short time 
and not years later.. . . The financial difficulties 
of the Buyers . . . were not caused by the Seller. 
Time lost by such internal troubles of the Com-
pany and personal difficulties of the Buyers was 
time taken from the reasonable time allowed the 
Buyers and Company to fulfill their pant of the 
contract. The financial difficulties are immater-
ial so far as determining what was a reasonable 
time for performance of the contract. 110 Utah 
342, 350, 173 P. 2d 277, 281-282. 
The court concluded that the four year lapse justified 
rescission of the contract. 
Applying the court's analysis in Commercial Security 
Bank of Ogden v. Johnson, supra, to the instant situa-
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tion, it is dear that Johnson's tender of $21,000 to Cat-
mull in May, 1973, was well within a reasonable period 
of time. In the instant matter, the parties contracted 
with specific reference! to the financing of the Snowbird 
ski resort facility. Catmull was made fully aware of 
Johnson's financing problems at the time he signed the 
1969 Amendment (R, 32, 42-44, 76, 87). And Catmull 
was also well aware that the ultimate purpose of John-
son's acquisition of the Free Coinage Claims was to con-
struct and operate a ski resort facility in the area. At 
the time of the 1969 Amendment, Catmull knew that 
there were no lifts or other ski facilities in operation, or 
even under consitruciion (R. 80, 87). In this case, the 
reasonableness of the time lapse must be measured with 
reference to these two contemplated occurrences, financ-
ing of the ski facilities and the eventual revneue-generat-
ing operation of the facilities. 
The record shows that Johnson was able to acquire 
financing for Snowbird shortly after the execution of the 
1969 Amendment (R. 35), Construction commenced al-
most immediately bat no facilities opened until Decem-
ber, 1971 and January, 1972 (R, 49). No revenue was 
generated by the Gad II lift, which crosses the Free Coin-
age claims, until February, 1972 (R. 36-37). Throughout 
1972 and 1973 Johnson made efforts to raise the money 
necessary in order to exercise his option on the Free Coin-
age Claims. With the facilties finally generating reve-
nues, Johnson tried to retain sufficient money to pay 
Catmull the $21,000 (R. 38). In the spring of 1973 John-
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son was able to make the $21,000 tender, but even at 
this time he had difficulty raising the necessary amount. 
Johnson communicated these difficulties to Catmull (R. 
39, 47). The Snowbird operating statements admitted 
into evidence are ample support for Johnson's testimony 
as to the difficulties he encountered in setting aside funds 
from the operation revenues. The ski facility netted a 
meager profit of $647.17 for the year ending May 31, 
1972, and netted a loss in the amount of $698,864.08 for 
the year ending May 31, 1973 (Ex. 14-D). That any 
funds were available at all for Johnson's tender in May, 
1973, is a credit to his diligent efforts as manager of the 
resort facilities to set aside funds for the Free Coinage 
Claims. The losses suffered by the resort in 1973, and 
the slim profit from the preceding year, indicate that the 
delay in the tender was the direct result of the resort's 
financial condition, rather than unjustified dihtoriness. 
Of further significance is the evidence that Catmull 
was not materially prejudiced by the delay in Johnson's 
tender. This is unlike the sellers in Commercial Security 
Bank of Ogden v. Johnson, supra, whose sole purpose in 
contracting was frustrated by the delay in the buyers' 
performance. The record reveals no interest of Catmull 
in the performance of the 1969 Amendment other than 
his desire to receive valuable consideration for his remain-
ing interest in the Free Coinage Claims. He did have a 
need for some immediate cash, in order to take advantage 
of an investment opportunity in 1969. This is why he 
agreed to accept the $17,000 figure for the first six months 
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of the option term (R. 87, 89). However, the terms of 
the 1969 Amendment dearly indicate that Catmull's 
willingness to sell was not solely predicated on receiving 
immediate cash, for he agreed to accept the $21,000 option 
figure for an indefinite time following the six month offer 
at $17,000. 
Other jurisdictions have applied the same test as 
that noted above, applied by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Commercial Security Bank of Ogden v. Johnson, supra, 
for determining what is a "reasonable time" for perform-
ance of a contract. In Colorado Woman's College v. Brad-
ford-Robinson Printing Co., (1945) 114 Colo. 237, 157 
P. 2d 612,, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a time 
lapse of approximately six years was reasonable in the 
light of the facts and circumstances of the case. The 
plaintiff in that case, a church-affiliated college, had 
obtained from the defendant-creditor a pledge in the 
amount of $2,500. This sum was to be in reduction of 
the note then outsitanding irom the college to the creditor, 
on the express condition that the college first secure 
sufficient funds to pay all its other outstanding old 
accounts and certain second mortgage bonds. The record 
indicated that the college had diligently pursued fund-
raising activities and finaly was able to tender to the 
creditor its balance due on the note, minus the pledge 
amount. The court noted: 
The measure of reasonable time is not by a 
period of limitation, but by the diligence and 
capability of endeavor and the reasonable adap-
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totion of methods to the end to be accomplished. 
157 P. 2d 612, 615. 
The court noted that the creditor had not been damaged 
by the delay and that the college had 
diligently and continuously kept up its solicita-
tions during the entire period in its endeavor 
to meet the condition . . . and clear up its debts, 
and there is no evidence of suspension or ineffi-
ciency or indifference or unnecessary delay, or 
of taking longer than was necessary conven-
iently to perform the condition. 157 P. 2d 612, 
616. (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, in the instant matter, the record clearly 
indicates that the tender of $21,000 was made as soon as 
it was conveniently possible. During the first years of 
a resort operation, when so much money must be ex-
pended for capital outlay, the revenues are insufficient 
to meet the expenses of the young enterprise. It must 
be emphasized that under Utah law, as well as Colorado 
law, appellants were not obliged to sacrifice other legit-
imate business expenses and needs in order to produce 
the $21,000 tender. Since the parties were clearly con-
tracting with specific reference to Snowbird's financing 
and operations, Snowbird's obligation was to produce the 
tender as soon as it was conveniently able to do so, fol-
lowing diligent and reasonable efforts to raise the money. 
The record is clear that such diligent and reasonable 
efforts were made by Johnson and Snowbird . The tender 
in May, 1973, was made as soon as it was feasible, and 
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well within a reasonable time following execution of the 
1969 Amendment. None of the facts leading to this con-
clusion are in dispute. Accordingly, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's erroneous conclusion with re-
spect to the reasonaibleness of the lapse of time. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUD-
ING THAT THE 1969 AMENDMENT WAS 
UNENFORCEABLE IN MAY, 1973, BE-
CAUSE CATMULL HAD AN OBLIGATION 
TO DEMAND PERFORMANCE BEFORE 
TERMINATING THE CONTRACT. 
Although this issue has never been squarely raised 
in Utah, other jurisdictions have consistently applied the 
rule that when the time for performance of a contract 
is mdefinite, a party desiring to no longer be bound by 
the contract must "place the other party in default," by 
demanding the contractual performance and allowing the 
other party a reasonable opportunity thereafter to per-
form. Glen Cove Marina, Inc. v. The Vessel Little Jennie, 
(E. D. N. Y. 1967) 269 F. Supp. 877; Boswell v. United 
States, (5th Cir. 1941) 123 F. 2d 213; Dempsey v. Stauffer, 
(3rd Cir. 1962) 312 F. 2d 360 (applying Pennsylvania 
law); Johnston v. Rothenberg, (1960) 270 Ala. 304, 118 
So. 2d 744; Leonard v. Rose, (1967) 65 Cal. 2d 589, 422 
P. 2d 604, 55 Cal. Rptar. 916. 
In Colorado Woman's College v. Bradford-Robinson 
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Printing Co., supra, discussed above, the Court noted that 
the failure on the part of the defendant-creditor to de-
mand payment by the college was a basis for denying the 
creditor avoidance of its contractiial obligation. The court 
noted: 
Time [for performance by the college] was not 
essential. The company could not in good con-
science be permitted Imowingly to let the efforts 
and expenses continue and other contributions 
be made, all on the strength of its pledge, by 
silence inducing the belief it was still recognized 
and in force, when in fact the company had se-
cretly determined to refuse payment . . . In such 
situation the company was required to notify the 
college giving a definite and reasonable time for 
complying with the condition. This is sometimes 
referred to as making time of the essence. Until 
a party is put in default, he may perform a con-
dition for which the contract fixes no time. It 
is settled law that unless time is of the essence 
of a contract, mere lapse of time does not avoid 
it or forfeit rights under it. And it is equally 
well settled that time is not of the essence of a 
contract which provides for a reasonable time. 
157 F. 2d 612, 616 (Citations omitted.) (Empha-
sis added.) 
Another case so holding, which is especially applic-
able to the instant matter, is Davis v. Cor dell, (1960) 237 
So. C. 88,115 S. E. 2d 649. In .thait case the plaintiff-seUer 
brought an action for rescission of a contract for the sale 
of land to the defendant-purchaser. The trial court or-
dered the contract vacated on the grounds that the de-
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fendant had delayed unreasonably in tendering the bulk 
of the purchase price due on the contract. There was 
no payment date specified in the ciontraot. The appellate 
court reversed, on the grounds that the seller had no 
right to rescind the contract and avoid the obligation to 
sell when she had not made a specific demand upon the 
buyer to tender the money due. The court noted: 
Time is not of the essence of a contract which 
is to be performed within a reasonable time, but 
either party can make it so . . . by simply giving 
notice to that effect. / / notice is not given, the 
contract remains in force. It may be sued on 
as and existing contract and damages for its 
breach recovered. But it cannot be treated as at 
an end and a forfeiture enforced. 
* * * 
Respondent was bound by her contract to allow 
appellant; a reasonable time for payment of the 
purchase price. The just and equitable principle 
before mentioned required that before termina-
tion of his rights under the contract by the ex-
treme remedy of rescission, appellant be given 
express, unequivocal and reasonable notice that 
unless within a specified time he should pay the 
purchase price in full . . . his rights would be so 
terminated. It appears that on several occasions 
. . . respondent made demand upon appellant for 
"some money" under the contract; but never 
did she notify him of any definite time after 
which, upon his having failed to pay, she would 
rescind it. 115 S, E. 2d 649, 655-6. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The implications of this rule of law on the instant 
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situation are clear. At no time did Catmull demand of 
Johnson payment of the $21,000 purchase price, there-
by placing him in default. The first indication of Cat-
mull's unwillingness to hooor his obligation was by a letter 
dated May 16, 1973 addressed to Johnson from Catmull, 
admitted into evidence as Exhibit 6-P. In that letter, 
Catmull stated: 
I wish to advise you I do Not Desire to sell My 
royalty on the property I sold you for any price. 
Even if this flat denial of obligation possibly could be 
construed as a demand for performance within a reason-
able time, Johnson responded with full performance of 
his obligation only eight days thereafter (Ex. 2-D), un-
doubtedly a reasonable time in which to raise such a sum 
of money. 
Without a clear, unequivocal demand for performance 
Catmull had no right to abandon his obligations under 
the binding 1969 Amendment, and refuse Johnson's ten-
der of the $21,000. The evidence is undisputed that no 
such demand was made. On this basis alone, this Court 
should reverse the ruling of the trial court and order 
specific performance of the 1969 Amendment. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPT-
ING AS THE ROYALTY FORMULA THAT 
METHOD USED BY THE UNITED STATES 
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FOREST SERVICE IN ITS SPECIAL USE 
PERMIT. 
There was lengthy testimony before the trial court 
concerning the proper method to be used in calculating 
the royalties provided for in the 1966 Agreement. The 
1966 Agreement provided that Catmull was to receive a 
minimum of two percent of the gross receipts attributable 
to the Gad II lift. The problem before the trial court was 
to fairly calculate what portion of the total lift operating 
receipts was fairly attributable to the Gad II lift, since 
no special pass is sold for skiing only on the Gad II lift. 
Assuming of course that enforcement of the 1966 Agree-
ment is proper, Catmull is entitled to two percent of what-
ever figure is determined to represent the Gad II lift 
gross receipts. 
The trial court concluded that the proper method to 
use in calculating the revenue attributable to the Gad II 
was the methodology used by the Forest Service in its 
Term Special Use Permit for Snowbird. Memorandum 
Decision, paragraph 3, Findings of Fact, paragraph 16. 
However, this conclusion is not supported by the evidence, 
and in fact is in contravention of uncontradicted testi-
mony and evidence before the court concerning the use 
which is in fact made of the Gad II lift. 
The record clearly indicates that the calculation of 
revenues attributable to particular ski lift is a more com-
plex matter than simply counting heads and ascertaining 
the total number of passenger rides any one lift performs 
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compared to other lifts. The complexity is caused by the 
fact that short lifts, which go into relatively easy skiing 
terrain, will transport a skier several more times in one 
day than will a longer lift which ventures into steeper 
and more difficult terrain. To equate a short "easy" ride 
with a long and "difficult" ride is unrealistic, especially 
when ski passes are purchased for a period of time (an 
all-day pass or a half-day pass, for example) rather than 
by a unit price per ride (R. 166, 197). Hence, the easiest 
method, of simply counting passenger rides for all facili-
ties and passenger rides for the Gad II lift, and then 
taking the percentage of total tram-lift revenue equivalent 
to the percentage of Gad II passenger rides to total pas-
senger rides, is not reflective of the true revenue gener-
ating power of Gad II. 
The United States Forest Service (hereafter "Forest 
Service") acknowledges as much in its manner of calcu-
lating its permit fees. The Forest Service has granted 
a Term Special Use Permit to Snowbird authorizing win-
ter sport use of certain forest land in the environs of the 
Snowbird resort (Ex. 12). The fee for such use is two 
percent of the net sales and other income from the facili-
ties located on forest land. Hence the Forest Service has 
a problem at least facially comparable to that created by 
the 1966 Agreement, i.e. attributing revenue to particular 
ski facilities and lite. 
The Forest Service calculates its permit fees by mul-
tiplying the total passenger capacity of all Snowbird's 
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lifts by the total slope distances of all Snowbird's lifts. 
The percentage of this figure which crosses forest land 
is then calculated. The resulting figure is multiplied by 
.02 in order to arrive at fee Forest Service's two percent 
permit fee. The calculation basically evaluates the pas-
senger capacity and the slope distance as the relevant 
factors by which to evaluate revenue-generating power 
of a lift facility (R. 161). This is the formula ordered 
by the trial court to be used in connection with the 1966 
Agreement at issue herein. 
However the trial court had better, and more pro-
bative evidence at hand by which to calculate the Gad 
II revenues. Snowbird called as a witness its manager 
of up-hill facilities, David Weatberbee (hereafter 
"Weatherbee") who gave extensive testimony as to his 
own on-site daily observations of the use made of the 
Gad II lift at Snowbird. He testified that Gad II in fact 
only contributes approximately five to six percent of the 
total tram-lift revenue at Snowbird, as opposed to the 
approximate 21% figure resulting from use of the Forest 
Service formula (R. 161). He fully explained the basis 
for this conclusion, with testimony which was neither 
impeached nor contradicted in the record. Weatherbee 
noted several factors tending to reduce the actual use 
of Gad II: (1) it is remote from the parking and main 
lodge facilities, commencing very close to the top of the 
Gad I lift, so that a passenger on Gad II must first take 
the tram or the Gad I lift in order to get to the Gad II 
lift (R. 131); it takes the skier into difficult and steep 
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terrain, with deep moguls which tend to make skiing the 
area even more difficult (R. 131); the difficulty and re-
moteness both tend to discourage the average day-pass 
skier and encourage use by season ticket holders (who 
pay less for their skiing) and Snowbird employees (who 
do not pay at all for their skiing) (R. 132); it is the last 
lift to be opened on snow-hazard days because of the 
avalanche danger in that particular \ticinity (R. 132); 
avalanche danger keeps the Gad II lift closed all day 
long more frequently than other Snowbird lifts (R. 132); 
the Gad II lift is closed earlier in the day than other 
lifts, as it sits nearer the top of the mountain and is the 
first area to be "swept" by the safety ski patrol (R. 132); 
and it is down for longer periods of time because of me-
chanical failure than the other lifts, because of its relative 
remoteness from the main Snowbird facilities (R. 133). 
According to this uncontradicted testimony of Wea-
therbee, the only witness before the court to testify con-
cerning revenues who had any personal knowledge as to 
the Gad II lift and the other Snowbird up-hill facilities, 
the royalties due Caitmull under the 1966 Agreement for 
1971-72 were $520, for 1972-73, $517, and for 1973-74, 
$1,789, or a total sum of $3,826. The personal observations 
of this knowledgeable expert are of far greater probaitive 
value than the abstract formula and equation used by 
the court. On the basis of Weatherbee's clear and uncon-
tradicted testimony, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's conclusions as to use of the Forest Service form-
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ula and remand for entry judgment consistent with 
Weatherbee's testimony and personal observations. 
Even if this Court concludes that use of a formula 
is a better or more reliable basis for calculation of the 
royalties than the testimony as to Weatheorbee's obser-
vations, use of the Forest Service formula is clearly 
erroneous. The evidence before the trial court estab-
lished that the Forest Service calculation fails to ade-
quately evaluate skier use of any particular lift in that 
it has no basis for evaluating the difficulties of the ski-
ing terrain serviced by the lift (R. 161, 166, 189-90). The 
Forest Service calculation considers only passenger capac-
ity and slope distance as the relevant factors. I t would 
have to consider also the factor of vertical rise in order 
to effectively assess the difficulty of the skiing terrain 
(R. 189-90). 
The evidence before the court indicated that ski re-
sort areas and lift manufacturers around the country con-
sider vertical rise as a necessary and relevant component 
in evaluating ski lift performance in their advertising 
and marketing (R. 171). The importance of this vertical 
rise factor, when consideired together with passenger ca-
pacity and slope distance, was explained at length by 
Weatherbee: 
We are interested here in attempting to deter-
mine what gross revenues can be assigned to the 
Gad II chair lift. None of these factors individu-
ally have anything to do with revenue. Taken 
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all three together they come with a percentage 
which by on-site observation is more accurate 
than any other figure . . . 
The capacity per hour is an assigned read-
ing. It is built in when a lift is manufactured. 
The cable slope distance is also a measured dis-
tance, and that involves the timing factors with 
the length of the lift, the entire length of the 
lift. And the vertical rise has to do with the dif-
ficulty of the terrain that lies underneath the 
lift. 
* # * 
[ Y]ou have to have all three if you are going 
to make any determination of revenue that can 
be assigned to that lift because all three are tied 
very, very closely together. 
The Forest Service isn't interested in any 
single lift producing revenue. They are inter-
ested in the whole shooting match at once. They 
want to know everything about the whole area. 
In this particular case we are only inter-
ested in assigning gross revenue to the Gad II 
chair lift. Short of selling a Gad II ticket, which 
we do not do, the only thing we can do is to come 
up with a satisfactory basis of the facility which 
most closely reaches what the on-site observa-
tions have been, and that its what I have tried 
to do in this particular case (R. 189-190). 
Weatherbee's calculations as to the use of this pro-
posed formula, passenger capacity x cable slope distance 
x vertical rise, were introduced into evidence as Exhibit 
20-D. Those calculations indicated that the percent of 
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revenue attributable to Gad II was 15.9%, rather than 
the Forest Service formula calculation of approximately 
21%. The reduction is caused by the realistic appraisal 
of the high vertical rise of the Gad II lift, and the relative 
difficulty of the terrain crossed by the lift. The difficulty 
of the terrain means that a more select, and smaller group 
of skiers use the lift, and that it takes those skiers a 
longer time to reach the bottom of the lift and re-board 
the lift. According to Weatherbee's uncontradicted testi-
mony, these factors are observable with respect to the 
Gad II lift, and their impact should be reflected in the 
calculation of revenue attributable to the Gad II life. 
In light of the evidence before the court, it was re-
versible error of the trial court to adopt the less accurate 
Forest Service formula for attributing revenue to the 
Gad II lift. The evidence does not support the trial court's 
use of that formula. This Court should reverse the trial 
court's conclusion, and if any judgment be entered what-
soever under the 1966 Agreement using a formula for the 
revenue calculation, it should be based upon the formula 
of passenger capacity x cable length x vertical rise in 
order that the revenue determination reflects the three 
relevant factors of passenger load, lift length, and the 
difficulty of the skiing terrain. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments and authorities, 
which indicate an accumulation of errors made by the 
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trial court, including the erroneous determination of the 
royalty formula, it is respectfully submitted that the 
judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
Respectfully submitted, 
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